

The Future of the Past—A Cautionary Lesson: Heritage and Financial Mismanagement at the Port Arthur Historic Site, 1987–1996 *

Andrew K.S. Piper

ABSTRACT: The former relics and ruins of Tasmania's infamous secondary penal station, the Port Historic Site is arguably Australia's premier non-Indigenous historic site. Since the tragic events of 28 April 1996, when 35 people were killed and another 23 wounded the Site has received an increased public profile which has translated into significant public funding of both its tourism and conservation operations. However, public funding in the two preceding decades evidenced a pattern of largesse followed by parsimonious tight-fistedness by both State and Federal governments. Such fickle funding arrangements have had a major impact upon the cultural significance of the Site and have wider implications in respect to the community's access to its history and heritage. This paper will explore the failure of successive Federal and State governments to intervene effectively for the long-term conservation of the Port Arthur Historic Site.

KEYWORDS: Port Arthur Historic Site, Heritage Management, Heritage Conservation, Heritage Funding, Tasmanian History

Australians Need to Cherish their Cultural Heritage, not Pillage it for the Short Term Gain of the Tourism Dollar.

The Port Arthur Historic Site is one of Australia's great tourism attractions. Its huge appeal is evidenced by the large numbers of Australians and overseas visitors who take the winding and tortuous trip from Hobart each year to experience firsthand the diversity of its convict and post-convict buildings, ruins and other relics. Its historic allure is

* The author would thank Emeritus-Professor John Ryan, Associate-Professor Janis Wilton and Professor Martin Gibbs who have both commented on an earlier draft. The author would further stress that the manner in which the cultural heritage of Port Arthur was mismanaged and exploited during the period covered in this paper is not a reflection on the current Port Arthur Historic Site Management Authority [PAHSMA] staff or management. Indeed, having visited the Site in March 2017, the author was very impressed with all facets of current heritage conservation practice and staff.

undeniable, with the 2015-16 financial year recording the highest ever visitation figures since the establishment of the Port Arthur Historic Site Management Authority (PAHSMA) in 1987, with some 308,612 daytime visitors and 35,568 night-tour visitors.¹

Arguably Australia's premier non-Indigenous historic site, it has since the tragic events of Sunday 28 April 1996, received an increased public profile which has translated into significant public funding of both its tourism and conservation operations. For the financial year 2013-14 PAHSMA attracted nearly five million dollars for conservation work from the State government and an additional \$240,000 from the federal government for conservation and tourism.² However, the public funding for conservation work during the two decades prior to the Port Arthur Massacre evidences a pattern of largesse followed by parsimonious tightfistedness by both the State and Federal governments. Such fickle funding arrangements have had a major impact upon the cultural significance of the Site and they have wider implications in respect to the greater/national community's access to its history and heritage.

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Using the Port Arthur Historic Site as a Case Study

This paper will explore the failure of successive Federal and State governments—particularly for the period 1987-1996—to intervene effectively for the long-term conservation of those places that offer the

¹ PAHSMA, 'Annual Report 2015-16', http://portarthur.org.au/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/06/PArthur-Annual-Report-2015-16_FINAL.pdf, 2016, p. 19, accessed 18 May 2017. As a means of comparison, even back in the 1990s the Site experienced good visitor numbers, with some 192,500 daytime visitors and 37,300 night-tour-visitors in the 1993-94 financial year (PAHSMA, '1993-94 Annual Report', p. 12).

² According to PAHSMA's Annual report for 2013-14, it received \$2,799,000 in a State government grant for conservation work at Port Arthur and at the Coal Mines Historic Site. It also received from the State government a further \$3,000,000 grant specifically for the Penitentiary Project, a major engineering undertaking that provided essential underpinning, structural support and environmental protection for the surviving walls of the penitentiary, the largest ruin at Port Arthur, which were at risk of imminent failure. Of this latter grant only \$2,114,588 was expended in the financial year with \$885,412 being carried over to the following financial year. Thus, PAHSMA effectively received from the State government grants totaling \$4,913,588 for conservation works at the Port Arthur Historic Site and the Coal Mines Historic Site for the 2013-14 financial year. The Commonwealth government provided a grant for conservation and tourism of \$239,941, of which \$149,999 was allocated to conservation works at Port Arthur and the Coal Mines and \$89,942 to tourism at these historic sites. The combined state and federal grants add up to \$5,153,529 for 2013-14. (PAHSMA, 'Notes to and forming part of the accounts for the year ended 30 June 2014', p. 44, *Annual Report 2013-14*, <http://www.portarthur.org.au/file.aspx?id=24035>, accessed 23 July 2015.) It needs to be noted that for the period 1987-96 PAHSMA was not responsible for the conservation or management of the Coal Mines Historic Site, nor other sites which it has subsequently assumed responsibility, such as the Cascades Female Factory Historic Site.

professional, the keen amateur and the wider public an alternative ‘text’ by which to interpret their history. PAHSMA itself extols the virtues of the Site as an important historic record in its marketing, stating that ‘[e]very building, every feature of [the] Port Arthur Historic Site has a story to tell’.³ However, the history of support for conservation activities places under a cloud just how long the fabric of the Site will be able to tell these stories, especially given its vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and sea-level rise.

This paper now focuses on the period 1987 to 1996, a time of parsimonious tightfistedness, and one only broken by Federal intervention following the Port Arthur Massacre. Thus, in part, this paper is a summary of a ‘special investigation’ into the finances and operation of the site. Much of the following reflection is based on personal experience. From 1991 to 1996, I was the senior heritage professional at the Port Arthur Historic Site, and, for much of that period, the only fulltime heritage professional, filling the roles of conservation manager, archaeologist, historian and curator; as well as overseeing all building and ground maintenance. This period was a most difficult financial time for PAHSMA, as successive State governments had cut the annual operating budget, and the Commonwealth funding was reduced to a mere trickle (despite the profile given the Site in the ALP’s *Creative Nation* policy statement).⁴ In the 1991-92 financial year PAHSMA had received \$786,000 in State and Commonwealth government funding, but, three years later, this amount had contracted to a meagre \$30,000.⁵ Urgent and vital conservation works were increasingly placed on hold, or not commenced, whilst tourism developments detrimental to, and destructive of, the historic fabric of the Site were given prominence, presumably in order to prop-up the worsening budgetary position.

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- ³ PAHSMA, ‘Port Arthur Historic Site’, http://www.portarthur.org.au/index.php?menu_code=100, accessed 20 September 2007. This exact description of the site is repeated in multiple tourism and education websites, such as Travel Oz Now (<http://www.traveloznow.com.au/details?listing=35>) and Find History in Your Area (<http://www.historychannel.com.au/classroom/history-in-your-area/4/tas>), both accessed 15 September 2015.
- ⁴ This policy document specifically identified Port Arthur, along with the Sydney Opera House and Old Parliament House, as part the most significant places listed on the then ‘Register of National Estate’. The policy stated: ‘These buildings have far greater economic, cultural and social value to Australians if they are conserved and recycled to be relevant and useful to contemporary life than if they are demolished.’ (Commonwealth of Australia, *Creative Nation: Commonwealth Cultural Policy, October 1994*, Canberra, department of Communication and the Arts, 1994, p. 71.
- ⁵ Tasmanian Audit Office, Auditor-General Special Report No 21: Special Investigation into Administrative Processes Associated with Preservation and Maintenance of the Port Arthur Historic Site, State of Tasmania, Hobart, 1997, p. 33.

Too Close to the Matter?

I admit at the outset that I hold some degree of personal bias in this story, and that the writing of this paper has been a cathartic exercise. The heritage professionals who were employed at Port Arthur during the 1980s and 1990s felt privileged to work on the conservation of the Site and were very passionate, even zealous, about the Site (as I am sure the heritage professionals employed by PAHSMA since that time, likewise, feel this commitment to the place). Many, however, left, as I did, feeling disillusioned, angry and cynical.⁶ As my resignation from PAHSMA was coupled with the tragic events of April 1996 and the dismal support of victims and those immediately affected in the aftermath of the Massacre, it took me a long time to reach a point where I felt I could objectively write the narrative of the actions that took place in respect to the conservation of the place during my tenure. I am motivated to do so in the hope that financial support for conservation works will not once more be overlooked, following what has been a relatively long period of sustained government support, as demonstrated by the recent significant funding for stabilisation works associated with the Penitentiary Project.

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Why are Sites Like Port Arthur So Important?

The document which guides best heritage practice in Australia is the *Burra Charter*. Its most publicly comprehensible format is presented in *The Illustrated Burra Charter*. The edition of this document that was in use in the 1990s stated the following on the importance of place:

One of the fundamental reasons for conserving places is that they contain information that documents, photographs, drawings, film or video cannot. Regardless of how skillfully a place may be captured on film or how evocatively it may be described, *there is no substitute for the experience of the actual place.*

Consider, for instance, the transportation of convicts to Tasmania in the nineteenth century. By reading and researching the subject, it is possible to gain a quite comprehensive knowledge of the penal system in Tasmania. But if you visit the prison buildings at Port Arthur you can perceive aspects of convict life not revealed by any documents, and you can come back a second or third time and see the place in a fresh way.

⁶ Over the course of my career working in heritage conservation in Australia I have meet and became acquainted with many professionals who have had an association with the Port Arthur Historic Site. Off the record conversations with these same professionals provides me with the confidence to make this generalisation, but I do not have permission to name individuals.

You can do this only while that place remains. *The insights we receive from places are diverse, subtle and not available from any other source.*⁷

Port Arthur has outstanding cultural significance. No other single site in this country exhibits so completely the male convict penal system, the system that founded colonial Australia. Port Arthur evidences a wide gamut of the life experiences under that system. In addition to its primary role as a secondary punishment station, that place specialised in the incarceration of probationary and juvenile offenders, and also the incarceration and treatment of aged, invalid, pauper and lunatic convicts and emancipists. It also makes a significant contribution to the Tasmanian economy. In financial year 2014-2015 some 1.15 million people visited Tasmania, spending some 1.89 billion dollars.⁸ Close to one fifth of these tourists visited the Port Arthur Historic Site, making it the state's fourth most popular tourist destination.⁹

The Site is made up of archaeological deposits, historic buildings, substantial ruins and remnants of original gardens and plantings, and other features, such as a convict burial ground. The cost associated with maintaining conserved houses that are roofed, principally those belonging to convict administrators and their subordinates, is relatively low. It is not dissimilar to the costs incurred in maintaining your own home. Basically good housekeeping principles, maintaining good drainage, keeping gutters cleared, regular painting and the like will maintain them. The ruins however, are a different category all together. They require constant injections of funding because the best conservation practice can ever do is retard the rate of decay. It cannot be stopped. But it can be slowed, and the degree to which it is checked is directly related to the amount of money invested in conservation works.

Between 1979 and 1986 Port Arthur benefited from a \$9,000,000 joint State and Federally funded project. Commonly known as the 'Port Arthur Conservation Project', its official title was the 'Port Arthur Conservation and Development Project', and while \$9,000,000 was expended on Port Arthur, only just over a third of this amount, some \$3,300,000, was expended on conserving the Site, which at that time evidenced extensive neglect.¹⁰ Significant amounts of funding went into the establishment of

⁷⁷ Peter Marquis-Kyle and Meredith Walker, *The Illustrated Burra Charter: Making good decisions about the care of important places*, Australia ICOMOS Inc., Sydney, 1992, pp. 10-11 (emphasis mine).

⁸ Tourism Tasmania, 'Tasmanian tourism snapshot: Year ending June 2015', 2015, <http://www.tourismtasmania.com.au/research/visitors>, accessed 28 October 2015.

⁹ Discover Tasmania, 'Top ten attractions', Tourism Tasmania, <http://www.discovertasmania.com.au/about/top-ten>, accessed 28 October 2015.

¹⁰ Tasmanian Audit Office, Auditor-General Special Report No 21: Special Investigation into Administrative Processes Associated with Preservation and Maintenance of the Port Arthur Historic Site, State of Tasmania, Hobart, 1997, p. 10.

necessary tourist infrastructure (such as the development of a caravan park and boat ramp at Garden Point—\$900,000), into redirecting roads (the Safety Cove link roadworks costing \$700,000), into installing a water reticulation system, and into constructing a sewage treatment plant.¹¹ Funds were also expended on resuming land in private ownership and constructing replacement community facilities—the historic site having functioned as a small township prior to the commencement of the conservation project.

Nevertheless, by the end of this project in 1986, most (but, importantly, not all) of the major restoration works required for the long term conservation of the Site had been completed. The Tasmanian Minister of Arts, Heritage and Environment had refused to give further financial support to the conservation of the Site. However, the Tasmanian Parliament did respond, and in 1987 it passed the *Port Arthur Historic Site Management Authority Act*, which transferred authority for the management of Port Arthur to PAHSMA.¹² This legislation then provided for a Board of six, supposedly balancing conservation and commercial interests, in that two members were to be ex-officio appointments; specifically, the Director of Lands, Parks and Wildlife, representing heritage perspectives and the Director of Tourism, representing business interests. But, in practice, as other Board members were drawn, almost exclusively, from the ranks of Tasmania's tourism business sector, the Board was unevenly balanced towards tourism enterprise interests. This arrangement was bolstered in 1989 when the Act was amended and:

The Board was required to balance history and archaeology with tourism yet at the same time to become a viable commercial enterprise as soon as practicable. The tension between these objectives ultimately led to the resignation of the Board in 1998 and the appointment of a new Board more focused on the heritage needs of the site.¹³

In the decade following the establishment of PAHSMA, the Site increasingly saw less and less money spent annually on conservation works, fewer and fewer professional conservation staff employed (until at one stage in the early 1990s there was but one) and fewer general staff employed on conservation works. This dwindling of resources to conservation works is well demonstrated by a State government endorsed

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Randall Mason, David Myers and Marta de la Torre, 'Port Arthur Historic Site: A Case Study', The Getty Conservation Institute, Los Angeles, 2003, p. 12, www.getty.edu/conservation/publications/pdf_publications/port_arthur.pdf, accessed 20 September 2007.

¹³ Tasmanian Archives Online, 'Port Arthur Historic Site Management Authority', TA1551, <http://search.archives.tas.gov.au/default.aspx?detail=1&type=A&id=TA01551>, accessed 15 September 2015.

Strategic Management Plan [SMP], costing well in excess of \$100,000. This SMP calculated that, from fiscal year 1995, \$500,000 (indexed) would be required for cyclical maintenance of the heritage features, buildings and ruins, as well as for aspects of infra-structure.¹⁴ This costing did not include any capital items, horticultural activities, such as tree surgery on historic oaks, elms and ashes, garden bed maintenance, and the like, nor maintenance of major infrastructure such as water and sewage reticulation and treatment. In addition, a further \$1,137,700 was seen as essential to be spent in the five fiscal years from 1995 to 1999 on catch-up maintenance.¹⁵ This catch-up maintenance had resulted from the grossly inadequate levels of funding allocated to Port Arthur in the period 1986-1994. A mere two years later, in 1996, as the Site was re-structured into a State government business enterprise [GBE], the amount to be allocated for conservation dropped on an annual basis from \$500,000 to a mere \$100,000.

As the person who annually, for five years, carried out conservation and maintenance audits of the Site and drafted the conservation budgets, I can state with confidence that the sums calculated in the SMP for conservation works were an accurate reflection of what was required. Both the State government and PAHSMA also accepted this SMP costing as valid. However, in an environment of ever decreasing resources—especially in the case of heritage; the State government decreed in 1995/96 that Port Arthur warranted zero funding—the base theoretical level of essential funding had further contracted. Indeed, at this time, the Board Chairman issued a directive that staff were to answer any questions related to the situation of State government funding with the line that PAHSMA operated on minimal government support.

In a Corporate Plan produced by the Board in 1996, as part of its GBE requirements, it was stated that for the financial years 1996/97-1998/99 the aim was to spend \$1,000,000 on conservation, half the amount identified two years previously.¹⁶ The SMP identified a base minimum for this same period of \$1,994,200.¹⁷ None of the variables affecting levels of funding had altered. In fact, because nothing remotely approaching the \$1,644,500

¹⁴ PAHSMA, *Port Arthur Historic Site Management Authority Annual Report 1995*, PAHSMA, Port Arthur, p.7 states: 'The three-volume strategy document was completed after approximately 15 months of extensive research and consultation, at a cost of \$100,000.' This costing does not in fact include the cost of Site staff involvement. For a costing of cyclical maintenance see *Port Historic Site Strategic Management Plan: Asset Maintenance Plan*, 1994, p. 5.

¹⁵ *Port Historic Site Strategic Management Plan: Asset Maintenance Plan*, 1995, p. 5.

¹⁶ *Port Arthur Historic Site Management Authority Corporate Plan*, 1996, p.5. The PAHSMA Corporate Plan is a legal requirement pursuant to section 41 of the *Government Enterprise Act 1995*.

¹⁷ *Port Historic Site Strategic Management Plan: Asset Maintenance Plan*, p. 5: \$500,000 for cyclical maintenance in 1997, 1998 and 1999. In addition to this there are the costs of catch-up maintenance—\$126,500 in 1997, \$275,500 in 1998 and \$92,200 in 1999.

had been spent in the two financial years before 1996/97, it could well be argued that the new estimate was much more like three times less than that which was required.¹⁸ What the Board did was to estimate what the Site's likely revenue would be for the period and then they adjusted the requirements of conservation to fit these parameters, instead of clearly stating the real requirements.

The Corporate Plan clearly demonstrated that PAHSMA intended to continue to accept inadequate funding for its conservation requirements for the foreseeable future. This document stated that:

Until such times as developments proposed in this plan have been completed, and the revenue predicted is available, the Authority [PAHSMA] is not in a position to fund conservation works on heritage buildings and structures to the extent required to meet its [legal] obligations.¹⁹

The Corporate Plan identified that the key performance target for conservation was related to the percentage of the (received) entry fees committed to it.²⁰ Whilst the proportion of funds allocated to conservation was intended to rise over time, it commenced at a paltry 4.91 per cent, increasing to a high of 18.79 per cent.²¹ This demonstrates the value PAHSMA attached to conservation works—at best it represents a meager fifth of its entry fees (which made up 89 per cent of income). As a means of indicating performance in conservation, this percentage of gross income was severely flawed because it did not relate to need, or to the actual works as carried out. The only honest means to measure performance in the area of conservation management at Port Arthur was, and is, to measure how much of the SMP identified cyclical maintenance works were completed each financial year (as well as how much of the catch-up maintenance was addressed). This position was recognised by the Tasmanian Audit-General when he found that:

It is unlikely that the funding for conservation works identified as being required by the Authority, will be sufficient if it is limited as planned to a sum equal to the profit of the Authority.²²

¹⁸ *Port Historic Site Statagic Management Plan: Asset Maintenance Plan*, p. 5: \$500,000 for cyclical maintenance in 1995 and 1996. In addition to this there are the costs of catch-up maintenance—\$382,500 in 1995, and \$262,000 in 1996.

¹⁹ Cited in Tasmanian Audit Office, *Auditor-General Special Report No 21: Special Investigation into Administrative Processes Associated with Preservation and Maintenance of the Port Arthur Historic Site*, State of Tasmania, Hobart, 1997, p. 12.

²⁰ Port Arthur Historic Site Management Authority Corporate Plan, 1996, p. 5.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Tasmanian Audit Office, *Auditor-General Special Report No 21: Special Investigation into Administrative Processes Associated with Preservation and Maintenance of the Port Arthur Historic Site*, State of Tasmania, Hobart, 1997, p. 22.

Board members were well aware of the likely ramifications of PAHSMA's declining financial position and the implications for the conservation of Port Arthur's landscape and fabric. As Board members were ministerial appointments, there was no desire or willingness to confront the Minister with the reality of the balance sheet. Nevertheless, as matters stood, the Minister ought to have been well-aware of the financial impediments to maintaining the heritage values of Port Arthur. In August 1992 the Parliamentary Standing Committee of Public Accounts initiated an inquiry into the general management and operational procedures of PAHSMA to assess, amongst other matters, 'the adequacy of protection of the Site at Port Arthur.'²³ Almost a year later, in July 1993, this committee had concluded that 'an injection of capital funds was required' in order to permit satisfactory conservation of the Site and the viability of PAHSMA.²⁴

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Rob Peter to Pay Paul

As a whole, board members were compliant and they had acquiesced to the then government's desire that they ensure no issue arose that could cause public censure. Indeed, strong implicit evidence exists that the Board deliberately created a false impression of the financial performance of PAHSMA in order to support Liberal Party policy, namely that of corporatising and privatising State Authorities. Prior to 1994/95 there was no depreciation calculated on capital items, and many recurrent maintenance costs were expressed as capital costs. As a result of this, the theoretical asset base of PAHSMA grew and the true picture of essential maintenance costs was blurred. Fundamentally, there was, over a number of years, a deliberate falsification of Port Arthur's true financial position in which capitalisation of maintenance works overstated the operating result.²⁵ The minister and the parliament were hardly ignorant of the distortion of PAHSMA's financial statements, but it served their purposes to ignore (adverse) findings, such as the 1993 Parliamentary Standing Committee of Public Accounts report, which identified 'the transfer of approximately one third of [Port Arthur's] capital funding to recurrent expenditure'.²⁶ This finding had exposed the inability of PAHSMA to operate as a self-funding GBE and, at the same time, to meet its legally-binding conservation obligations under its own act. Likewise, the Auditor-

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

General's office had exposed other substantive failings in PAHSMA's financial reporting. For example, in the 1992-93 financial statement, PAHSMA recorded 'a write back of superannuation of \$131,657 instead of charging an expense of approximately \$100,000 overstated the operating result', and, in 1993-94, 'no charge was booked in the accounts for a superannuation pension liability of \$322,128', again overstating the operating result.²⁷

For years PAHSMA had submitted annual reports which included favourable financial statements that were much to the detriment of the adequate conservation of the Site. By this, I mean that the Board robbed Peter to pay Paul. Peter being the conservation of the Site and Paul the profit statement. Substantial profits were shown, for example, the fiscal year 1994 showed a profit of \$838,386.²⁸ These surpluses were funded by the cancelling of essential heritage work, an example being the denial of funding to stabilise the rear retaining walls of the Law Courts. As a result, the rear of this convict built building collapsed in early 1996. This component of the Site has now been lost forever. This is but one example of many.

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Acts of Neglect

There always seemed, however, to be funding available for tourism infra-structure, even non-essential or competitive infra-structure. An example of this would be PAHSMA's financial support to the concessionaire operator of the Garden Point Caravan Park. By February 1996, PAHSMA had spent \$42,000 (and more was to be spent) on assisting this operator to develop holiday cabins, at a time when PAHSMA was seriously investigating constructing its own holiday cabins as a new revenue stream. Likewise, in 1995 PAHSMA had purchased the lease of the Broad Arrow Café for \$396,000, and the following year, that of the Frances Langford Tearooms for \$180,000.²⁹

In early 1997, on 14 January to be precise, the Hon. John White MHA, the then shadow Minister for the Environment, wrote to the Auditor-General requesting an appraisal of PAHSMA's financial arrangements and their compliance with legislative obligations.³⁰ In particular, concerns were raised that: the PAHSMA was failing 'to adequately fund catch-up and

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

²⁸ Port Arthur Historic Site Management Authority Annual Report 1995, p.22.

²⁹ Tasmanian Audit Office, Auditor-General Special Report No 21: Special Investigation into Administrative Processes Associated with Preservation and Maintenance of the Port Arthur Historic Site, State of Tasmania, Hobart, 1997, p. 37.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

cyclical maintenance’; that it was manipulating the ‘costs and budgets relating to capital and maintenance expenditures’; and, that there were ‘particular sites where essential maintenance [wa]s being ignored or delayed’.³¹ At this time, a number of voices, including senior parliamentarians, such as John White, were raising the concern that PAHSMA was not executing its legal requirements, in respect to conserving the heritage of the place, as set out in the PAHSMA Act and its legally binding management plan.

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The Legal Obligations

This latter document stipulated that the focus of management needed to be ‘towards conservation of the fabric of the site to keep from harm, decay or loss the structures, spaces and elements that accurately reveal the significance of the site.’³² It also—and quite unambiguously—had placed the requirements for heritage conservation over those related to tourism, stating that ‘the principal direction of management ... will be to conserve the fabric of the settlement ... while providing visitor requirements ... with minimal impact.’³³

Perhaps part of the reason for the Board’s advocacy of tourism-related infra-structure while failing to support conservation was its members’ connections to the tourism and development industry and their (ambivalent) philosophy towards conservation and the place of heritage. The Board had failed to foster the heritage values of the Site within government. This was brought about by the fact that they themselves continually exhibited a lack of respect or comprehension for these values. In 1996, an attitude held by the then General Manager and present amongst the Board was that much of the Site was already a ruin and that there was therefore nothing wrong in allowing it to further disintegrate. This attitude was relayed to me by staff who had it put to them directly by Board members.

I myself had this very perspective put to me by the General Manager, on 31 October 1996, when he stated ‘that the Board saw ruins as ruins and if they fell down so what, they would still be ruins’, a position that he concurred with.³⁴ Hardly in-keeping with the legal obligation ‘to keep from harm, decay or loss’ the fabric of the site.³⁵ Yet PAHSMA could not plead ignorance of their heritage responsibilities, nor of the consequences of any

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Port Arthur Historic Site Management Plan, 1985.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Andrew Piper, diary entry, 31 October 1996.

³⁵ Port Arthur Historic Site Management Plan, 1985.

such inaction. In July, 1997, the Tasmanian Audit Office had recommended that PAHSMA should, at the very least, undertake an assessment of the long term consequences of continued delay to commencing conservation works, especially to salient and high profile structures such as the hospital, penitentiary and the model prison.³⁶ PAHSMA responded to this recommendation stating that the consequences of inaction were ‘obvious’, stating that: ‘If these buildings are allowed to deteriorate to the point of collapse, the cultural values of the site and its ability to attract visitors will decline.’³⁷

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Icarus Performance Troupe's 'Roo'd' at the Penitentiary, Port Arthur Historic Site
Photo by Matthew Newton, Courtesy of Ten Days on the Island

From 1986 onwards

In the decade following the end of the Port Arthur Conservation Project there was an abdication of government responsibility and a devolving of accountability to a Board of Management that lacked both the knowledge and the skills essential to maintain, conserve and interpret the Site. At no time during the period 1987-1996 was any person with expert knowledge

³⁶ Tasmanian Audit Office, *Auditor-General Special Report No 21: Special Investigation into Administrative Processes Associated with Preservation and Maintenance of the Port Arthur Historic Site*, State of Tasmania, Hobart, 1997, p. 25.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

or professional qualifications in conservation or heritage management appointed to the Board. Further compounding this situation was a decision, one made in 1996, by the Tasmanian State government, to move responsibility for oversight from the Department of Environmental and Land Management—one of the few government departments in Tasmania to employ anyone in the field of heritage conservation and cultural resource management, and thus capable of giving an informed judgment on Port Arthur—to the Department of Tourism, which completely lacked any expertise in heritage management, maintenance or interpretation. A repercussion of this transfer was a trivialisation of the Site's cultural significance. One example of this was a planned sound-and-light show development. Although not progressed, work on this proposal was quite advanced in mid-1997. It was intended that the show would be based on the life of a convict bushranger who escaped from Port Arthur in the 1850s. As with other aspects of the then interpretation of Port Arthur, what was planned was a focus on a sensational but very minor facet of the Site's history to the detriment of everyday, but nevertheless central aspects of the Site's history. (There is a place for sensationalism and myth, and that place is the artificial heritage 'wonderlands' like Sovereign Hill. A site as significant as Port Arthur should not have to perpetuate and maintain myth in order to survive.)

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Failure to Make and Comply With the Appropriate Policy Decisions

The Board was supposedly responsible for establishing and ensuring implementation of policies that effected the long-term direction of the Site. They were not performing this task. The reason for this was twofold. Firstly, despite having spent over \$100,000 on the SMP, the blue print of how to achieve the vision of Port Arthur becoming the leader in the fields of, and a centre of excellence in, heritage conservation and cultural tourism, the Board failed to implement its recommendations in a holistic manner. That is, they 'cherry-picked', selectively working towards the implementation of a few features of the plan which had appeal to their limited perceptions of what was in the best interest of the Site.

The second reason stifling Board performance was their inability to make decisions and then to abide by those policy decisions. It constantly made *ad hoc* changes, apparently on the flimsiest of whims. Certainly, there was no adherence to the conservation policies set down in the SMP. While there were countless examples of the lack of resolution on the part of the Board, one case will suffice. In early 1993—despite major concerns and objections being raised by myself (in the capacity of being the only heritage professional on the Site) and the Australian Heritage

Commission—a building in the core of the Site, known as Trentham, was developed into a commercial nursery. The business plan for this endeavour was subsequently carried out after specific works had been completed, and when it was becoming increasingly clear that the business was unprofitable. As a result, this business was closed and the Board resolved, as a matter of policy, that this was an area of commercial activity that fell outside the scope of the core functions of the Authority and that it would not re-enter into such an enterprise again. Yet, despite no internal or external changes which would positively improve the chances for a commercial nursery being successful, the Board again, (regardless of its own recent policy decision and previous experience) some two-and-a-half years later, re-entered the business of selling plants. A similar reckless pattern was to emerge as before, with no business plan developed prior to making the decision to operate a nursery enterprise. The concept of basic planning containing elements of investigation, analysis, goal setting, implementation strategies and setting performance indicators was not followed. Prior to late 1996 there had been no official analysis of its performance.

Purely at face value it would appear to have been struggling at that time and only surviving as a result of drawing upon resources which should have been directed towards the conservation of the Site. For example, the Site's ground supervisor and horticulturist, who should have been focusing upon maintaining the rare and significant botanical and landscape heritage of the Site, had his days occupied in operating and overseeing this commercial activity. At some stage between 1997 and 2000 the Trentham Garden Nursery ceased to operate as a commercial enterprise.³⁸

The Board needed to adhere to the provisions of the *PAHSMA Act* and also to its own policies as set out in its own endorsed document the SMP. In the mid-1990s it was, at best, paying lip service, at worse, expressing total disregard of the Act. There was virtually no attempt to comply with the *Burra Charter* or to work within the boundaries of accepted heritage conservation practice. The heritage clauses of the *PAHSMA Act* were paid but scant attention. This is well exemplified by the erection of a stage within the ruin of the Penitentiary at Beating Retreat 1995, for a pseudo military tattoo. This structure was completed despite heritage advice that this action would needlessly endanger the ruin, place at extreme risk certain rare and unique heritage features and, almost certainly, cause damage to the fabric. Despite strong protest from myself against this proposed action, the scaffolding to support the stage was erected within the ruin for the sole reason that it gave a better image for televising the event. The awning over the stage collected a considerable weight of water from rainfall, with the real possibility of the entire stage collapsing. Had

³⁸ No mention of this commercial activity is to be found in PAHSMA annual reports from 2000 onwards, the year that these became available online.

this eventuated, then a substantial portion of the ruin would have likewise collapsed. The erection and dismantling of the stage did result in needless damage to the historic fabric.

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A Reflective Perspective on the Fiasco

The crux of the problem that results from the ‘user pays’ model, which was being imposed upon Port Arthur, was that historic sites were now to be market-driven instead of being resource-driven/ market-orientated. ‘Developments’ were being approved before their conservation implications could be assessed. This was well evidenced by initial Commonwealth funding for Port Arthur in the aftermath of the 1996 massacre, which did not address a single conservation issue, but, rather, saw the fast tracking of a major development—a new visitor centre and car park. Indeed, it appears that both the Tasmanian government and the PAHSMA Board viewed the Commonwealth funding as an opportune circumstance to pursue the development of tourism infrastructure. By mid-1996 the exact nature of the developments had not yet been publicly released. However, it was reasonable to assume that they would ‘include a new visitor information centre, car parks and walkways’.³⁹ The Minister for Tourism and Minister Responsible for Port Arthur, the Hon. Ray Groom MHA, had pushed for as early a start on these developments as possible:

I have asked that work begin immediately to finalise plans for the major redevelopment of the site. I want actual site work to begin as soon as possible.⁴⁰

In an official Tasmanian Government media release, Groom then stated:

Construction of major new visitor facilities will be underway at Port Arthur historic site by the end of this year.

"The project will be the biggest undertaken by the Port Arthur Historic Site Management Authority," State Tourism Minister and the Minister responsible for Port Arthur, Mr Ray Groom, said today.

Mr Groom has asked the Chairman of the site's management authority Board, Mr Michael Mazengarb, to present conceptual plans early next month.

³⁹ From memo to all staff (PAHSMA) from Ray Groom, Minister for Tourism, 13 June 1996.
⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

The Federal Government will contribute \$2.5 million towards the redevelopment of a new visitor information centre, retail, food and beverage outlets. A new car park, and walkways also will be developed.

Mr Groom wants the project undertaken as a matter of urgency.

Tenders for the work are expected to be called early August.⁴¹

The interesting thing to note in this matter, 'the biggest [project] undertaken by the Port Arthur Historic Site Management Authority', is that it included absolutely no commitment to fund then urgently required, major capital conservation projects, such as stabilisation of the Hospital and conservation of the Model Prison.

It seemed anathema, to concerned historians and heritage experts, that development should be fast tracked within a State reserve which was acknowledged to be one of the most fragile in terms of cultural landscape and archaeological deposits. This was especially the case since these developments fell within both the 'archaeologically sensitive zone' and 'core site area' as identified in the SMP:

Archaeologically Sensitive Zone: No works involving ground disturbance should be undertaken in this zone before approved archaeological procedures.

Core Site Areas: The core site areas include culturally significant structures, landscape and other site elements, archaeologically sensitive zones and areas sensitive to visual intrusion. Areas sensitive to visual intrusion have had taken into account ridgelines and landscape buffer zones and provides for negligible impact of an assumed two storey structure.⁴²

The developments also fell outside what was permissible within the then current legally binding 'Site Management Plan'. Even though this document dated from 1985, and thus should have been reviewed before this time, it still nevertheless set the parameters for conservation and development on the Site.

At the time funding became available for a new visitor centre, the Site Management Plan was being re-drafted, but by persons who had only limited knowledge or experience of Port Arthur. It would appear that the major reason for the re-write was to give credence to the contemplated developments. Instead of analysing available information, and only then determining what was in the best interest of the Site, this planning procedure operated from a perspective of what was best for the market and

⁴¹ Tasmanian Government Media Release, Ray Groom, MHA, 13 June 1996.

⁴² Port Arthur Historic Site Strategic Management Plan: Facilities Master Plan, 1994.

then amending the plan in order that it fitted this market perspective and not that which was best in the long-term conservation interests of the Site. Since management plans are public documents which have to be put out for public comment, the fast tracking of these developments had meant essentially that the public was excluded from having any input into developments at Port Arthur. The decisions were left entirely in the hands of a small group of persons who were, essentially, developers, and who had no expertise or understanding of cultural heritage conservation.

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PAHSMA's Culpabilities

Even if the public had been given the opportunity to comment on the proposed developments, it is doubtful if they would have been listened to, because PAHSMA seemed incapable at that time of listening to even the expert advice it received from the planning consultants it had itself engaged. Between 1992 and 1996 there were three major planning documents completed on behalf of the PAHSMA. These were: (1) the Strategic Management Plan (cost \$100,000); (2) the Dockyard Precinct Conservation Plan (\$25,000); and, (3) the Military Barracks Precinct Study (\$25,000). The recommendations and implementation strategies of these plans, as well as those contained within specific building conservation plans, and the Site Management Plan, were not adhered to; rather, they were 'shelved' for the favoured Port Arthur management technique of *ad hoc* and crisis-based decision-making.

This circum-navigating of accepted planning procedures was not novel at Port Arthur. There are another two cases which I shall discuss below, that of the installation of a substation and the clear felling of vegetation at the adjacent Point Puer Historic Site. I shall also further discuss the above example as these planned developments did jeopardized and delayed by some ten to fifteen years the capacity for Port Arthur to receive World Heritage status.

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To Obtain World Heritage Status

Initial work on including Port Arthur in a serial listing of Australian convict sites commenced in 1995, but it was not until 2010 that this was achieved. The executive summary of the 2008 Federal government's *Australian Convict Sites: World Heritage Nomination* stressed that the sites included within the nomination 'fully meet the requirements of the *UNESCO Operational Guidelines to the Implementation of the World*

Heritage Convention', and that they would be covered by a 'world class management system ... ensur[ing] their protection under various laws and policies'.⁴³ However, various actions undertaken in the 1990s by PAHSMA suggest that this assertion was challengeable by the mid-1990s.

The risk of the Site not being conferred World Heritage status became apparent at an Australian ICOMOS Expert Workshop on Australia's Convict Sites which was held at Port Arthur in late May 1996. This workshop had the purpose of further advancing Australia's then proposed World Heritage Serial Listing of convict sites. The draft report on this workshop then stated that:

Boundaries are a major item in selecting sites because the site must be managed to protect its World Heritage values and a buffer zone around the nominated property is required.⁴⁴

The workshop expressed its concerns over the 'Pressure on Port Arthur as a self-funding Government Business Enterprise to introduce more commercial enterprises: own accommodation, car park relocation'.⁴⁵ It also was deeply concerned about the cost of on-going maintenance and how this was to be met, the level of commitment to ongoing conservation programs, and in particular the capacity (or apparent incapacity) for the enforcement of management plans under statutory provisions.⁴⁶

A perceived urgent issue was the planning context of places especially 'commercial management plans which site owners might be currently developing'.⁴⁷ The concerns were that Port Arthur was proceeding with a series of unplanned commercial developments which did not address the conservation requirements of the Site and were also not part of any then current conservation or projected management plan. Further, these developments would directly jeopardise the capacity for Port Arthur to be nominated as they would encroach well within the buffer zone of the Site.

An UNESCO official who attended the Expert Workshop had good reason to be suspicious of PAHSMA's capacity to adhere to accepted and legal planning procedures, as demonstrated by two development assessment failures: the installation of an electrical substation and the opening up of Point Puer to mass visitation. In late 1994, a substation was installed at the rear of the Watchmen's Quarters/Penitentiary complex.

⁴³ Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, 'Executive summary', *Australian Convict Sites: World Heritage Nomination*, Canberra, Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, 2008, p. 5.

⁴⁴ Jane Lennon, Draft Report on Australia ICOMOS Expert Workshop on Australia's Convict Sites. Australia ICOMOS, June 1996, p. 8.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

This was installed with only one-week's notice to conservation staff. While there had been, some prior discussion regarding the installation of a substation, the lack of forewarning caused a major interruption in the conservation works programme, as well as unnecessary destruction to heritage fabric. It had been agreed at the October 1994 PAHSMA Board meeting that any substation development would be placed on-hold pending the results of (a then yet to be commissioned) study into the electrical requirements of the Site in respect to special events and a then possible sound and light show development.

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Cutting Corners

This study was never undertaken. Instead, the Chairman of the Board made an *ad hoc* decision to accept an offer made by the Tasmanian Hydro Electrical Commission to refurbish Port Arthur with a supposedly cut-price substation, one which subsequently turned out to be antiquated and more expensive than first anticipated. In terms of the impact on fabric, the fast tracking of this major development—and work, which fell outside the scope of the site management plan (and thus its legality is questionable)—had meant that the various standard and requisite pre-development investigations could not be undertaken. As a result, subsurface heritage features and archaeological deposits were destroyed by this development. In particular, a series of historic drains, which were still functional in the same area, were either bisected or eliminated, in order to better allow for the construction of the substation and the installation of a subsurface cable. As a result, drainage in this area was adversely affected such that further disturbance to subsurface features would have to occur to rectify the resultant problems.

Another example of an unassessed development proceeding took place there in 1996, when trees and vegetation on the historic reserve of Point Puer, which was, and is, administered by PAHSMA were felled and removed, and this was quite outside the framework of any conservation or management plan, but done on a purely *ad hoc* basis, and on the whim of the previous Tasmanian Minister for Environment and Land Management, John Cleary. What is internationally recognised as some of the most significant and fragile surviving historic fabric relating to the development of the reform of juvenile offenders was exposed to needless risk from erosion and increased visitor impact. This was carried out in an attempt to generate more revenue for PAHSMA by offering another attraction. Point Puer was seen purely as a tourist curiosity and its heritage values were ignored. At this time, this development was one which fell outside both the then existing Site Management Plan and the Strategic Management Plan.

It was disheartening that PAHSMA had decided to proceed with a major unplanned development at Point Puer, given that it was then currently the recipient of two National Estate Grant Program grants totalling \$50,000 for the express purpose of developing a conservation management plan for this priceless historical site.

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Blundering and Muddled Thought

It takes little investigation to further understand the imprudence of this development and the extreme negative impact that it was likely to have upon the conservation and maintenance of the rest of Port Arthur. It was a fact (as well demonstrated by the catch-up maintenance costs in the Strategic Management Plan) that Port Arthur was unable to maintain its existing conserved site features and infra-structure in an environment of diminishing government funding. At this time, it was operating without such financial support, and was thus even less able to maintain that which had already been carefully conserved and developed. To continue to open up new areas of the Site, to further stretch already vastly inadequate financial and human resources, leading to the further detriment of the Site as a whole, demonstrated what can only be seen as managerial incompetence. Not only was funding to the rest of the Site reduced as a result of the capital costs associated with the opening up of Point Puer to significant levels of visitation and so to increasing the costs associated with maintaining these, but there were a number of additional major capital expenses. These were the necessary upgrade to the Site's access roads and to the development of a jetty.

Conservation works also had suffered at Port Arthur as a result of major special events, particularly the 'Beating Retreat'. One of the major reasons for this was that highly skilled conservation staff were pulled off heritage projects to works related to these highlighted events. A conservative estimate, made by myself, would be that 600 man-days were lost to special event related activities between 1994 and 1996. This loss was compounded by the fact that these events took place at the very time of the year when the weather was most favourable for exterior conservation works.

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And the Matter of Corporate Support

The rationale behind these events was to raise the profile of the Site, in order to access corporate business sponsorship. However, by the end of 1996 no substantive corporate sponsorship for heritage had been generated

and, at the 1996 Beating Retreat, there was insufficient corporate sponsorship to even permit the hiring of a marquee. These special events did not deliver the predicted sponsorship. I believe that this was because these activities were market-driven, whereas resource-driven smaller events such as the Isle of the Dead Memorial Day or the return of the old church bells did generate media exposure, and so these positively raised the profile of the Site, and at virtually no cost to PAHSMA. The cost effectiveness of the major event approach to profile raising ought to have been questioned, for there were cheaper and more effective means of doing so. It should also have set off alarm-bells as to the capacity for PAHSMA to control conservation budgets from income generated from commercial activities. Indeed, in 1997, the Tasmanian Auditor-General had reported that:

There is little evidence from commercial activities undertaken over recent years that there will be any substantial profits to fund the scale of conservation works needed to secure the long term future of the Site.⁴⁸

In his the draft report, the Auditor-General had implied that expectations that commercial activities could ever adequately fund conservation works at Port Arthur were based more on ‘hope’, given PAHSMA’s poor track-record at generating revenue.⁴⁹ In the final report he further stated, in reference to the period 1994-1996, that ‘no profits have been generated from operating activities in recent years’.⁵⁰

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Facing up to Alarming Statistics

Two major special events, the Beating Retreat and an Irish Festival, ran at huge losses, again taking scarce financial resources away from conservation works. Official figures, which to some extent ‘massage’ the real costs as items such as staff salaries and on-costs were not fully included, show that PAHSMA lost \$27,672 in 1993/94 and \$119,218 in 1994/95 from staging special events.⁵¹ Whilst the financial disaster of the 1995 Beating Retreat was blamed on weather conditions, the reality was that poor financial management was the prime cause of the loss. Even if another 10,000 patrons had attended the event at \$10.00 per head—and it

⁴⁸ Tasmanian Audit Office, *Auditor-General Special Report No 21: Special Investigation into Administrative Processes Associated with Preservation and Maintenance of the Port Arthur Historic Site*, State of Tasmania, Hobart, 1997, p. 19.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁵¹ Port Arthur Historic Site Management Authority Annual Report 1995, p.25.

is extremely questionable whether the event could have coped with such numbers—there still would have been a loss in the order of \$20,000.

Indeed, all major special events at Port Arthur in the mid-1990s had run at a loss. One might well ask why the then Board continued to support such events. It could be argued that they were merely pandering to the then Chairman's somewhat fanciful notions. Despite being illegal under the *PAHSMA Act*, the then Chairman's advertising business had made a profit out of special events like Beating Retreat, since it handled the advertising.

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A Lack of Respect

There was a lack of control by PAHSMA over the organisers of Beating Retreat, the event which caused or threatened destruction of its charge and its historic fabric. In 1994, the sound reverberation from the unplanned firing of a cannon by the Arms and Militaria Society presented the very real risk of collapse of severely unstable aspects of the Penitentiary facade. In 1995, the Australian Army had pitched a tent on the old Prisoners Barracks site. Thirty-nine stakes were driven into what had already been demonstrated to be one of the most significant archaeological deposits at Port Arthur. It is well known that these deposits are extremely shallow and that the evidence is fragile. There is no doubt that irreparable damage was done to this unique site. These are but two examples, but they demonstrate a pattern of both disrespect for the heritage values of Port Arthur and an inability on the part of PAHSMA to exercise control over all facets of special events.

The most distressing example of a lack of respect for the unique heritage values of the Site was the 1995 positioning of the stage scaffolding within the ruin of the Penitentiary. It is 'difficult to comprehend a more demeaning impact and lack of respect', as well as a more potentially destructive decision.⁵² A well-respected conservation architect had, immediately prior to this, stated:

I am not familiar with the size and type of structure which you propose to erect within the penitentiary. I am, of course, familiar with the building itself. My concerns about the proposal are that the erection of a structure within the building may lead to risks in the case of structural collapse and the compromising of the building's cultural significance by the insertion of an alien and unrelated structure.⁵³

⁵² Letter from Conservation Manager, Andrew Piper to General Manager, Craig Coombs dated 16 October 1995, copy in author's possession.

⁵³ Letter from Peter Freeman, Freeman Collett Tasmania to Conservation Manager, Andrew Piper dated 19 June 1995, copy in author's possession.

The Authority's own consultant engineer stated:

Whilst probably low, there is a real risk of scaffolding failure due to human error, material failure or, as at the recent Beating Retreat, unforeseen loadings. Such failure could easily lead to localised damage to the historic works and potentially large scale collapse of walls.

From an engineering perspective I would prefer not to risk damage to the historic buildings due to scaffold erection ...⁵⁴

A Sad Reflection, Then, and Still

In my capacity as Conservation Manager, I had expressed my deep concern prior to the installation of this scaffold, stating in conclusion to a memo on the subject that:

I believe that we would be derelict in our duty of conserving the Site if we permit this scaffold to go ahead. I therefore must strongly recommend that the current decision be reversed and the scaffolding be located in front of the Penitentiary.⁵⁵

My protests to protect the heritage fabric did not result in a further consideration as to where the Board might have permitted the stage to be erected. My concern, back in late 1996, was that an attempt would again be made to erect a stage within the Penitentiary, since increasingly, this important piece of convict heritage was viewed by a tourism/development oriented Board as no more than perhaps a 'gothic backdrop'.

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A Rueful Reflection and National Challenge

To conclude, I would invite you to consider whether historic and nationally important places, such as the Port Arthur Historic Site, ought to be a funded and managed as major heritage places of national significance, or, to be treated as tourist icons, and to be milked for all their worth? While heritage conservation and tourism are not mutually exclusive, they can—as this case study has shown—prove to be inequitable bed-fellows. Personally, I believe that Port Arthur is not another resource to mine but a

⁵⁴ Letter from David Brett, Thompson Brett Consulting Engineers to Conservation Manager, Andrew Piper dated 23 June 1995, copy in author's possession.

⁵⁵ Memo from Conservation Manager, Andrew Piper to General Manager, David Reed dated 9 January 1995, copy in author's possession.

national treasure to be cherished. Yet, despite it being acknowledged by scholars as the Nation's foremost historic site, the remnants of the internationally significant convict settlement were permitted to decay in the decade from 1987 to 1996 as a result of incompetent management, seemingly uncaring State and Federal governments, and tragically a trivialisation of the cultural significance of a site as significant as Egypt's pyramids or China's Great Wall.

What is arguably the jewel in the crown of Australian's rich European cultural heritage was shamefully tarnished through apathy, parochialism, abysmal management and grossly inadequate funding from the cessation of the Port Arthur Conservation and Development Project in 1986, on until the Port Arthur Massacre in 1996, and then beyond that national tragedy. This was a period in which procrastination, by both State and Federal governments, detrimentally impacted upon the conservation of the priceless Tasmanian Site's archaeological deposits and historic buildings, gardens, grounds and ruins.

There are no replicas that can impart the nuances and subtleties of the real thing. We have but one opportunity to conserve Port Arthur.

How long it survives is in our hands!

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